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“Free market environmentalists,” advocates of deregulation quite
active in government policy-making, and many scholars think of
environmental problems as property rights problems.1 The free market
environmentalists imagine that the solution to just about every problem
involves perfecting private property rights, at the expense of government
control.2 Daniel Cole, M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law at the Indiana
University School of Law at Indianapolis, provides a much needed response
to this privatization argument in his latest book, Pollution and Property.
But many scholars not hostile to public environmental protection also tend
to view environmental problems as property law problems, so the book
addresses a theme of general interest.
Professor Cole shows that too many historical, ecological, political,
and cultural factors influence the success of regimes to justify some general
a priori rule favoring private property (or any other property regime) as a
solution to all environmental problems. While that may seem like an
obvious conclusion to environmental specialists and sophisticated property
scholars, it has not been obvious to free market environmentalists and many
law and economics scholars. Cole points out that Richard Posner has
opined that there is no economic justification for public ownership, (pp. 2324), and free market environmentalists have vigorously urged privatization
of just about everything.3 So, this book makes an important point. The
book should help economists and political scientists, who may not be
familiar with property law concepts, grapple with these issues. It might
help environmentalists and law professors rebut free market
environmentalists, who enjoy strong corporate support4 and, therefore,
*

Associate Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. J.D. Yale Law School
(1989). The author would like to thank Robin Malloy for helpful comments and Jeff Philp
for research assistance.
1
See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON AND DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM (2001). Cole analyzes the first edition of this book, which appeared
in 1991.
2
See id.; Eric Pianin, Free-Market Environmentalists Gaining Stature, WASH.
POST, June 4, 2001, at A4.
3
See, e.g., ANDERSON and LEAL, supra note 1.
4
See Samuel Stanke, Note, Like Wilderness, but Need Oil? Securing America's
(continued...)

WHAT’S PROPERTY GOT TO DO WITH IT?

2

wield influence disproportionate to the value of their ideas. And it’s
conceivable that it might influence some of the free market
environmentalists (but this may be wishful thinking). Pollution and
Property should also aid property teachers trying to convince their students
that this ancient branch of law remains relevant today. (The Supreme
Court’s increasingly activist takings jurisprudence will likely aid that
project as well).5
The book’s attempt to make “some normative arguments in favor of
multiple property systems and admixtures of property systems” fares less
well than its argument for agnosticism regarding property regimes. (p. ix).
But this problem has fairly deep roots in the limitations of property
metaphors.
This review will show that a property rights framework does little
to illuminate the problem of selecting among government strategies for
pollution control and provides an awkward and incomplete lense for
viewing pollution problems. It does this primarily through a review of the
limited success of scholarly deployment of property rights typologies to
understand emissions trading. This review will help clarify the structure of
emissions trading and elucidate the limitations of the property rights
perspective in illuminating regulatory regimes.
The review will then explain that despite these inherent limitations,
Cole’s book succeeds well in making its major point rejecting an a priori
rule favoring any particular property regime. Finally, it will review his
attempts to reach some normative conclusions about the value of
admixtures of property systems.

I. PROPERTY RIGHTS VIEWS OF POLLUTION AND EMISSIONS TRADING
4
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Professor Cole has chosen this book’s title to remind the reader of
J. H. Dales’ Pollution, Property, and Prices, and the Law, usually identified
(wrongly, as it turns out, see p.x.) as the first work to recommend emissions
trading. Fittingly then, this book’s first case study involves emissions
trading under the Clean Air Act. (pp. 45-84). While we shall see that Cole
has useful things to say about emissions trading, my principal purpose in
discussing emissions trading here involves identifying some of the limits
of a property rights framework in illuminating regulatory pollution control
issues.
A. The Property Rights View of Pollution
The view that property rights offers a fruitful way to look at
pollution has roots in the recognition of our tendency to overuse freely
available resources, a view that goes back to Aristotle, according to Cole.
(pp. 1-2). Garrett Hardin built on this to posit a tragedy of the commons where users compete to ruin resources upon which all users depend - and
proposed a choice between assigning private property rights to a resource
and government regulation as a means of solving environmental problems.6
Long before the creation of modern environmental law, property owners
relied upon common law nuisance actions to address pollution.7 Still,
viewing environmental problems as property problems can, in some ways,
obscure understanding of pollution and its control.8
The entire language of property can become an awkward hindrance
to discussing air pollution, for example. Professor Cole reminds us that at
common law, the public has traditionally enjoyed rights of some kind over
the atmosphere and other natural resources, which some common law
6
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courts have, at times (and with respect to water, very often), described in
terms of ownership. (pp. 2, 20-23). That observation offers an important
counter to any suggestion that restrictions on polluting activities involve
some questionable departure from common law baselines. But thinking of
pollution problems as questions about “ownership” of the atmosphere raises
as many questions as it answers about how to conceptualize pollution and
its control.
A focus upon the harms that pollution inflicts upon us may aid
conceptualization of pollution problems better than discussions of
atmospheric ownership. Air flows all around us. Neither the breathing
public nor the polluter has an interest in occupying the air.9 But we cannot
avoid daily, indeed second by second, contact with it. We all must breathe.
And when we breathe the air, a kind of use, the pollutants in the air can
harm us.
Since manufacturing processes and other activities produce
contaminants that escape into the atmosphere, one can describe pollution
problems as a conflict between breathers and polluters over use of the
atmosphere. But that characterization works unevenly. Some very
common pollutants do create breathing difficulties after inhalation,10 which
seems like a classic use conflict, since the polluter’s use of the atmosphere
as a dumping ground impedes the breather’s use of the air for respiration.
But sometimes the harms of pollution involve physical interference with
natural atmospheric functions, rather than human use of the atmosphere (if
breathing is a use). For example, emission of ozone depleting substances
and allow ultraviolet radiation to cause skin cancer.11 And greenhouse
gases disrupt the climate.12 Neither ozone depleters nor greenhouse gases
interfere directly with use of the air to breathe. Thus, the concept of
pollution causing harms to others may better capture the problem of
pollution than discussion of conflicts over ownership of resources.
While we can plausibly describe pollution problems in terms of
property, a torts conception seems more apposite than thinking of this in
9
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terms of property rights in the sky. After all, most of us never visit, let
alone use, the stratospheric ozone layer.13 Thus, pollution can harm us not
so much because anybody directly occupies the ozone layer, only
supersonic transports, satellites, and rockets go there, but because it causes
harms to people on earth.14 A torts conception also better fits the thinking
of the public and elected representatives, who make the most important
regime shaping decisions regarding pollution control.15 To them,
limitations upon activity (e.g. pollution control requirements) do not assert
or reject ownership claims, they just limit pollution to protect public health
and the environment. Furthermore, at common law, air pollution was
actionable as either a tort or a nuisance, as Calabresi and Malamed’s
landmark work on property and liability rules reminds us (albeit
obliquely).16 Furthermore, even the nuisance cases often treated air
pollution not as a contest over ownership of the atmosphere, but as a claim
regarding interference with use and enjoyment of land.
This last observation about the failure of property rights concepts
by themselves to consistently describe what precise property is involved
matters a lot to the debate about emissions trading. In that context, property
rights metaphors have obscured rather than illuminated understanding of
emissions trading and of the arguments free market environmentalists make
about it.
B. Emissions Trading Through a Property Lense
Many commentators view emissions trading as a property rights
based alternative to “command and control” regulation. In an emissions
trading program, the government distributes (or sells) permits allowing less

13
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pollution than currently exists.17 Polluters may purchase “extra” reductions
from polluters who have fewer emissions than permitted, in lieu of meeting
their permit limits at their own facility.18 The program creates a market in
allowances, permission to pollute at a certain level.19
Yet, a major source of positive law on this point denies the
relevance of property outright. The Clean Air Act states unequivocally that
an emission allowance does “not constitute a property right.”20
Furthermore, the term “allowance” itself suggests that a government
license to pollute is at issue, rather than an ownership right. Indeed, the
Clean Air Act specifically defines an allowance as a “limited authorization
to emit” pollution.21 And the statute states that the Act does not “limit”
federal authority to “terminate or limit such authorization” or state authority
to demand further reductions to meet state Clean Air Act obligations.22
These definitional provisions would seem, at first glance, to reinforce the
view that property rights have little to do with emissions trading. A license
involves permission to carry out an activity, which is different from

17
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Replacing the Command and Control Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L.
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generated an enormous literature, see, e.g., David M. Driesen, Does Emissions Trading
Encourage Innovation?, 33 ENVT’L. L. REP. (Envt’l L. Inst.) 1001 (2003) [hereinafter,
Driesen, Innovation]; Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation by Incentives: Myths, Models, and
Micromarkets, 80 TEX. L. REV. 531 (2002); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and
the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000); Royal C.
Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking, and Takings, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 527 (1996) (reviewing an intertemporal trading program for wetlands
conservation); David M. Driesen, Choosing Environmental Instruments in a Transnational
Context, 27 ECOLOGY L. Q. 263 (2000) [hereinafter Driesen, Transnational] (discussing
international application of emissions trading); Ann Powers, Reducing Nitrogen Pollution
on Long Island Sound: Is There a Place for Pollutant Trading, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 137
(1998) (discussing proposal to use nitrogen trading regionally to control water pollution);
Driesen, supra note 12; Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM J. ENVTL. L.
171 (1988); Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this
Thoroughbred Hobbled, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217 (1988); Robert W. Hahn & Robert
N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era for an Old Idea?, 18
ECOLOGY L. Q. 1 (1991); J.H. DALES, POLLUTION PROPERTY AND PRICES 92-100 (1968).
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establishing a fee simple ownership interest.23
For free market environmentalists this simply means that the law is
defective. The law should recognize a property right, and all would be well
if it did so.24 Suggestions that imperfect property rights impede emissions
trading usually offer no explanation of the nature of the imperfection and
the desired cure. And even those not calling for “perfection” of property
rights often conceive of emissions trading as involving some sort of private
property basis, notwithstanding Congressional repudiation of that idea.25
The property rights lense may obscure understanding of emissions
trading, because great conceptual difficulties bedevil attempts to describe
these regulatory programs in terms of property. Perceptive scholars like
Carol Rose, Richard Stewart, and now Daniel Cole, have recognized and
addressed this conceptual difficulty.26 They have sought to develop a richer
typology of property to accommodate property that is neither purely public,
nor purely private. Much of this focuses on variations upon, or contrasts
with, the idea of common, as opposed to private or state, property.
Professor Cole offers a variation on this typology theme. He argues
that emissions trading involves a shift from a public property regime to a
mixed property regime. (p. 45). This idea of emissions trading as
involving mixed property fits well with the rich property rights conceptions
that other scholars have brought to bear on this problem. Rich conceptions
23

See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973) (declining to compensate
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(1989) [hereinafter, Hahn & Hester, Markets] (suggesting that “the lack of clearly
quantified property rights” can discourage trading and recommending various changes to
protect against “confiscating” the “property rights.”); Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester,
Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L. Q. 361, 379 (1989)
[hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Lessons ] (if future confiscation is probable, than the value of
emission rights is reduced and trades are less likely). Cf. Jeanne M. Dennis, Smoke for
Sale: Paradoxes and Problems of the Emissions Trading Program of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, 40 UCLA. L. REV. 1101, 1140 (1993) (proposing protecting
allocation of permits for five years).
25
See, e.g., Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 227
(2001); Rose, supra note 5; Richard B. Stewart, Privprop, Regprop, and Beyond, 13 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 91 (1991). Cf. Carol M. Rose, Essay, The Several Futures of Property:
Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129,
163 (1998) (describing emissions trading as involving “property-like” rights).
26
See Rose, supra note 9; Rose, supra note 25, at 163 (describing emissions
trading as involving “property-like” rights); Stewart, supra note 25.
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of typologies, however, obscure a fundamental problem in the use of such
conceptions to distinguish emissions trading from traditional regulations.
We cannot test the claim that the regime has changed without a detailed
examination of which (if any) property rights have shifted in going from
traditional regulation to emissions trading. Nor can we understand the
meaning of calls to perfect property rights if we do not understand precisely
what rights are involved.
Unfortunately, typologies of property rights do not explain who
owns what under an emissions trading scheme. Some commentators
suggest that the choice of emissions trading implicates the issue of who
owns the sky, while others suggest that polluters own allowances,27
notwithstanding positive law to the contrary. Professor Cole does not
clearly choose between these two conceptions. (p. 46.) Both of these
conceptions are somewhat plausible, but difficult to understand. It is not
clear what we mean when we suggest that polluters own the sky or that they
own allowances. And application of typologies simply obscures this
fundamental issue.
1. Owning Sky. Daniel Cole sometimes suggests that emissions
trading should be thought of primarily in terms of ownership of the
atmosphere.28 He defines the shift from traditional regulation to emissions
trading as a change from a public atmospheric rights regime to a mixed
property regime. (pp. 38, 44) This suggests that emissions trading
privatizes some rights to the atmosphere.
The claim that shifting from traditional regulation to emissions
trading enhances private ownership over the atmosphere at the expense of
public ownership turns out to be problematic.29 Suppose that the
government distributed allowances, but did not make them transferable. By
27

See, e.g., Rose, supra note 25, at 144, 165 (referring to rights in “pollution
control” and “emission rights”) .
28

Cole characterizes the Clean Air Act as imposing duties upon polluting firms’
use of the atmosphere. (p. 38). He then associates with privatizing some public property
rights in environmental goods, such as the atmosphere. (p. 46) (first italic in original,
second added). In the same sentence, however, he says trading might be though of as
privatizing public rights in “emissions.” Id.
29
Professor Cole recognizes that emissions trading cannot be precisely thought
of in terms of ownership. Daniel H. Cole, From Local to Global Property: Privatizing the
Global Environment?: Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and
Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVT’L POL’Y F. 103, 115 (1999). He analogizes
emissions trading to a leasehold. I do not mean to suggest that thinking of emissions
trading in terms of property is impossible. Indeed, Cole’s rich analysis of property shows
that it is. But rather that the tendency of property talk to remind us of ownership makes the
property-based approach difficult and potentially misleading.
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allowing pollution, government would have given away some of the
public’s rights. In principle, a gift of allowances does not differ from a
traditional performance standard. Both allow some pollution. And both
therefore infringe on public ownership of the atmosphere.30 It would seem
that one might define any regime that departs from zero emissions as a
mixed ownership regime.31 If so, then emissions trading may offer nothing
new in terms of the types of property rights in the atmosphere.
Gerald Torres in a recent essay32 suggested one way of
distinguishing trading’s affects on atmospheric ownership from those of
traditional regulation. Trading does allow a polluter to avoid clean-up by
purchasing allowances from some far away plant.33 This might interfere
with the rights of those living near the plant in the air they breathe.34 But
general ownership talk alone may not provide a sufficient basis for
evaluating his claim. The analysis would ultimately depend upon the scope
of pre-existing individual rights to the air around individuals (whether
rooted in ownership or not) and the question of whether trading in a
program where government may (in effect) confiscate allowances interferes
with those rights.
While Torres shows that Cole’s view of trading as changing rights
in atmospheric rights is plausible and potentially valuable, one can describe
the environmental justice issues that flow from allowing reductions far from
one neighborhood to justify refusing to make reductions more simply and
clearly by employing a torts vocabulary. We expect to avoid harming
people’s health. Reductions of harms injuring white suburbanites does not
justify allowing pollution damaging the health of people in poor minority
communities to continue.35 The claim that property rights in the atmosphere
30

Daniel Cole seems to recognize this point, characterizing “issuance of pollution
permits” as “partial privatization” regardless of whether the permits are transferable. (p.
45). Moreover, he associates partial privatization, such as evinced in issuance of a
nontransferable permit, with a mixed property regime. Id. This makes the basis for his
claim that emissions trading involves a “shift from a public property/regulatory regime to
a mixed property/regulatory regime”, (p. 44), elusive.
31
Cf. Rose, supra note 25, at 132 (discussing a concept of “limited common
property” that is neither entirely public nor entirely private).
32
Gerald Torres, supra note 25.
33
See id. at 262.
34

See id. at 262-63 (arguing that trading can be understood as diminishing “the
citizen’s entitlement to be free of pollution.”)
35
See James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of
Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 627 (2000) (discussing toxic hot spot
problems); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics and Equity II: The European Experience, 58
(continued...)
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shift under trading, while potentially important, turns out to be
questionable.
2. Emission Allowances. Cole also follows other property rights
scholars in suggesting that emissions trading might be thought of as
involving rights in allowances. (p. 46)36 Notwithstanding the language of
the Clean Air Act denying property rights in allowances, trading might
affect ownership of allowances, rather than ownership of the sky. For the
statute authorizes polluters to trade allowances,37 and it defines noncompliance with the acid rain title as emission of sulfur dioxide “in excess
of the number of allowances held.”38 Thus, some polluters can comply by
purchasing allowances from polluters that emit less than allowed, rather
than by limiting their own emissions.
Normally, when we sell something we own it; and when somebody
buys something, she owns it.39 So this trading of allowances would suggest
that polluters own allowances. But the statutory language denying property
rights in allowances makes this simple conclusion impossible.
Professor Cole provides the key to resolving this conundrum when
35
(...continued)
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 417 (2001); Stephen M. Johnson, Economics v. Equity: Do MarketBased Environmental Reforms Exacerbate Environmental Injustice?, 56 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 111 (1999); Richard Toshiyuki Drury, Michael E. Belliveau, J. Scott Kuhn, Shipra
Bansal, Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment
in Air Quality Policy, DUKE ENVT’L L. & POL’Y F. 231, 235 (1999) (claiming that pollution
trading in Los Angeles has “led to concentrated air emission hot-spots in low-income and
minority communities); Comment, What is Good for the Market Can be Bad for Health:
Emissions Trading Under SCAQMD Rule 1610 and the Unjust Environmental Effects, 29
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 539 (1999). Cf. Driesen, Transnational, supra note 17, at 11-12
(discussing problems of international equity in international emissions trading)
36

Cole sometimes writes about ownership of allowances and sometimes about
ownership of emissions. (pp. 46, 53). Writers do not appear to distinguish between
ownership of allowances and ownership of emissions, so I take the liberty of paraphrasing
Cole as using the word allowances. But the two are not the same. Ownership of emissions
is the wrong concept.. Polluters sell allowances representing emission reductions, not
emissions. To see this assume that two polluters emit 100 tons of pollution a year. They
now get allowances to emit 60 tons a year. If polluter A reduces to 60 tons a year, he has
60 tons of emissions, but he has nothing to sell to polluter B. To sell to polluter B, he must
reduce below the 60 tons reduction required. If he reduces to 50 tons, for example, he may
sell 10 tons of “extra” reductions to another polluter. The commodity being sold is not
emissions, it is emission reductions below those required by government. Indeed, to be
more precise, it is a claim that these reductions are being made that is sold.
37
42 U.S.C. § 7651b.
38
42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b).
39
Rose, supra note 25, at 131 (property facilitates trade between owners).
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he writes that recommending a specific property regime for an
environmental problem does not suffice; we need to specify precisely what
rights and duties are involved. (p. 12). He correctly argues that this need
flows from the inchoate nature of ownership, which does not invariably
entail the same bundle of rights. Id.
Let’s unpack the emissions trading bundle. A polluter has a right
to sell (or buy) an allowance, but no right to retain it in the face of a
government demand for it.40 Once we focus on the specific rights in and
outside the polluter’s bundle, we have some shop of justifying the claim
that emissions trading has changed some aspect of property relations.
Emissions trading has created a right to sell and buy allowances. This right
to sell and buy is different from traditional regulation, where a pollution
allowance has no market value, because each polluter must individually
comply with government-imposed limits.
This description of trading as conferring a right to buy and sell
allowances, however, does not suffice. Polluters may not sell all of their
allowances as a general matter, without violating the law. They may only
sell unused allowances.41 For example, if a polluter formerly emitting at
100 tons now possesses 50 tons of allowances (each authorizing on ton of
emissions), she cannot continue emitting at 100 tons (or 90 tons or 50 tons)
and sell her 50 allowances.42 If she cuts emissions to 40 tons, however, she
may sell 10 tons of allowances, for she did not use all of the allocation.
This example shows that polluters really sell extra emission reductions, for
the 10 tons represents the difference between actual emissions and the
legally required reduction.
The buyer, moreover, does not acquire an emission reduction in a
physical sense. For emission reductions are physical events in particular
locations.43 She acquires the right to use evidence of somebody else’s
“extra” reduction as an excuse from full compliance at her facility.44
Indeed, even without allowance trading nothing prevents polluters
from selling certificates stating that they reduced emissions by an amount
40

See 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(f); Hahn & Hester, Markets, supra note 24, at 117
(equating fear of changes in emission regulations with confiscation of property rights in
allowances).
41
See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(b) (discussing unused allowances).
42

See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(g) (making it unlawful to emit sulfur dioxide in excess
of the amount of allowances held).
43
See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 17, at 303 (pointing out that emissions can
only be physically verified where they escape into the atmosphere).
44
See 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(g) (defining compliance as emissions in excess of the
number of allowances held).
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greater than required.45 Allowance trading involves a conditional promise
by the government, however, to allow the reductions represented by these
inchoate claims about having done something useful elsewhere to count
toward compliance with a regulatory obligation.46
This suggests that one might think of allowance trading as a
regulatory decision to make regulatory obligations less location specific,47
rather than as a significant change of property rights. For emissions trading
makes allowances tradable, only in the sense that by limiting pollution and
agreeing to accept purchased allowances to satisfy these limits, the
government has made something that could have been sold anyway,
valuable in practice. In other words, the regulatory regime creates scarcity
(albeit with flexibility) to make the theoretically possible but economically
worthless trade economically valuable. Thus, only by focusing on specific
regulatory rights can we understand emissions trading; general typologies
tell us precious little.
This focus on specific rights also makes it possible to understand
arguments to perfect property rights in emission allowances. Perfection
implies restoring the missing right to the bundle: The right to retain
allowances or demand compensation in the face of a government demand
for their confiscation.48 Confiscation in this context means one of two
things, either making emission limitations more stringent or declining to
recognize a purchased allowance as at least a credit toward satisfying a
cleanup obligation.49 A federal regulator may decline to recognize a credit,
because the claim of an emission reduction that the sold allowance
represents turns out to be false.50 State or federal regulators can impose
45

See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 17, at 324 (pointing out that a law
authorizing trading with no limits on pollution source’s emissions would create no
incentive for reductions or trades).
46
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(g) (redefining compliance as possession of
sufficient allowances) with 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(4) (defining compliance as obeying a
specific standard for a facility).
47
See Driesen, Dichotomy, supra note 17, at 332-336 (analyzing trading as
offering “spatial flexibility”).
48
See Hahn & Hester, Markets, supra note 24, at 117.
49
See Dennis, supra note 24, at 1105 (more urgent need for reductions might lead
to confiscation of allowances). See generally Hahn & Hester, Markets, supra note 24, at
117.
50
Daniel Cole may have something like this in mind when he writes that retention
of administrative authority to limit allowances allows EPA “to implement the program
without fear of having to compensate utilities for “taking their allowances.” See Daniel H.
Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and Environmental
(continued...)
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more stringent demands because of local air quality needs or new
information indicating that we need greater reductions than those provided
for in a trading program.51
Arguments to perfect property rights in this context involve
demands that government not adjust emission limitations in the face of new
scientific information (or public demand) and that officials not make certain
adjustments in the face of false claims.52 I argue in The Economic
Dynamics of Environmental Law (MIT Press 2003) that environmental
problems grow over time, because of population growth, increased
consumption, and other factors, so a static approach to environmental
protection may have little to recommend it.53 Talk of perfecting property
rights obscures the true underlying issues about how to manage the tradeoff
between stability to encourage cost-decreasing trades and the need to
protect the public properly from environmental harms that may grow over
time.
If enough sticks are missing from the bundle of rights, ownership
becomes an unhelpful - indeed, a misleading - concept. As soon as we state
that a polluter owns allowances or does not own allowances (or the sky), we
have obscured our understanding of emissions trading. For polluters have
some rights we associate with ownership and not others. General
statements about ownership obscure this. And unpacking the bundle
properly requires analysis of environmental law that begins to look like
regulatory work, rather than property rights analysis.
Typologies distinguishing between private, public, mixed, and
common property do nothing to clarify distinctions between emissions
trading and traditional regulation. For both trading and traditional
regulation reflect a combination of private and public rights. And
describing emissions trading as involving a property right suggests
ownership of something (if not to property scholars, then at least to the
general public), and therefore obscures significant issues regarding
emissions trading. Only when we describe precisely what rights the
polluter acquires under trading and compare those rights to traditional
regulation do we understand trading. And once we do that, we become
involved in environmental legal analysis that make property rights
50

(...continued)
Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 103, 113 (1999).
51
Cf. Driesen, Transnational, supra note 17, at 21-22 (discussing need for local
reductions to serve local needs in the international context).
52
See Rose, supra note 25, at 170-71.
53
See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(2003).
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metaphors seem beside the point.
II. PROFESSOR COLE’S CASE FOR AGNOSTICISM
If property rights conceptions have so little to offer, the reader might
wonder at my claim that Professor Cole offers a convincing refutation of
the free market environmentalists’ position favoring private property
regimes. But Cole’s case relies in part upon precisely the kind of
complexity that makes it hard to use property rights to understand
emissions trading. (ix) The free market environmentalists’ simple
dichotomy between government control and private ownership just does not
capture the world in which we live.
Moreover, property rights talk may illuminate some things, even if
it obscures others. Hardin’s insights stem from a property rights model, and
that model does illuminate fundamental problems that environmental law
must address. Notwithstanding the title’s emphasis upon pollution,
Pollution and Property addresses a wide range of environmental problems,
including natural resources problems. With respect to natural resources,
property metaphors may prove more helpful than in the pollution case.
After all, in natural resources law fee simple ownership, either public or
private, frequently matters. But property talk in the pollution context can
prove unhelpful unless quite carefully elaborated.54 More direct
consideration of the precise contours of legal rights and responsibilities and
their policy implications frequently yields more cogent insights.
Professor Cole develops a theoretical framework rooted in property
rights scholarship and institutional economics.55 Cole points out that the
assumptions Coase makes in positing the Coase “theorem” (absent
transaction costs, owners would negotiate efficient solutions to problems,
54

Cf. Rose, supra note 25, at 169 (discussing how scholars of water law find
calling entitlements “property” without considering background context is unhelpful).
55
This positions him to contribute something to an important project in the legal
academy and elsewhere - the development and application of insights from institutional
economics. Edward Rubin has argued that institutional economics may create a discourse
among legal scholars of disparate views, a necessary antidote to the tendency of scholars
to talk past each other when methodological approaches vary with the policy preferences
of the writer. See Edward Rubin, The New Legal Process, The Synthesis of Discourse, and
the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1413-1417 (1995-96). See also
Sidney A. Shapiro, Matching Public Ends and Private Means: Insights from the New
Institutional Economics, 6 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 43, 45-47, 48-53 (2002)
(employing institutional economics to analyze the question of accountability for private
actors performing public functions). So, one hopes that his decision to frame his arguments
in terms of institutional economics creates an opportunity for dialogue.
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including environmental problems) would create optimal pollution levels
with or without property rights. (pp. 3-4). The world of no transaction
costs, perfect information, and perfect markets would make property
irrelevant, he suggests.
But Cole, following Coase himself and the institutional economists,
argues that in the real world transaction costs create friction that interfere
with optimal pollution levels and with efforts to define property rights. (pp.
4-5.) In this real world, the question of which property rights regime is best
becomes more difficult.
Professor Cole discusses each type of property regime, showing that
none of them perform well in all circumstances. He makes this point
through concrete examples of how all types of regimes perform unevenly
in addressing environmental problems. These case studies constitute the
book’s greatest strength. Professor Cole’s previous books, Environmental
Protection in Transition (co-edited with John Clark, 1998) and Instituting
Environmental Protection: From Red to Green in Poland (1998), involved
exercises in comparative law, and Cole makes good use of that approach
here, making international comparisons part of the picture. For example,
while conceding that free market environmentalists can point to significant
failures of state ownership in land, Cole shows that Poland under
communist rule retained 27% of its forests in pristine condition. (pp. 106).
Hence, Poland has the last stands of primeval European forest and freeroaming herds of European Bison. Id.
Cole also argues that emissions trading shows that mixed property
regimes do not always perform well, but often do. In a chapter derived, at
least in part, from a previously published article in the Wisconsin Law
Review,56 Cole argues that the Act’s historic reliance upon traditional
regulation can be defended as efficient, largely because emissions trading
could not perform “efficiently” without good monitoring unavailable during
the Act’s early years. (pp. 67-84). As the technology advanced, argues
Cole, an inefficient regime became more efficient. This chapter will have
value for students of emissions trading and the instrument choice debate.
It also illustrates Cole’s point that the performance of property regimes
depends on technological factors that rule out a priori generalization.
My favorite part of the book contrasts previous private ownership
of Stonehenge with current public ownership. (pp. 137-149). Without
giving too much away, both regimes had their share of problems.
Cole makes a strong case for agnosticism. Because the advantages
and disadvantages of competing property regimes vary with cultural,
56

Daniel H. Cole and Peter Z. Grossman, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 887 (1999).
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technological , ecological, and institutional factors, a general theory of
which property regime is best does not work withstand analysis. (p. ix).
III. TYPOLOGIES AND NORMATIVE THEORY
As my analysis of emissions trading shows, framing understanding
of environmental regulation in property terms necessarily involves some
conceptual difficulties. Cole admirably brings forward a number of
important insights. Still, I have some concerns with how Professor Cole
handles the problems his conceptually rich treatment forces him to cope
with.
Cole makes a number of telling points. He claims that no property
is truly private, in the sense that the owner’s use exists apart from
government protection and potential limits. (p. 9). He also points out that
in cases where a corporation or multiple owners share interests in some
property, it becomes difficult to distinguish between private property and
common property. (pp. 10-11).
A major move involves defining public regulation as a propertybased regime. (p. ix.). This definition is plausible, because one can view
any regulation as an assertion of public ownership in a natural resource.57
It allows Cole to claim that all approaches to environmental problems are
property rights approaches. (p. ix). This move also highlights the long
historical tradition of recognizing public rights in natural resources,
including air and water, which Cole tellingly describes. (p. 20-23).
Once he defines all ownership involving some regulation as
property-based, however, then Cole must describe everything as some sort
of property regime (except perhaps a laissez-faire approach to a generally
accessible commons, like the ocean). In trying to create a rich typology,
given the ambiguities he perceptively recognizes, he ends up confusing the
reader. He states that his book will rely upon the conventional three item
typology of private, common, and public property, albeit with caveats. (p.
13). But he does not do that. He adds a fourth type, mixed public and
private property. (p. 18). Combining Cole’s choice to treat all regulation
as a property regime and his point that all private property is subject to
some government regulation should yield the result that this fourth type,
mixed property, is not a type at all, it’s almost everything.58 Professor Cole
57

See Rose, supra note 25, at 137 (regulation “can be seen as an assertion of
public rights in previously unowned . . . common resources.”)
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A chart suggests otherwise (p. 10), but that chart is nowhere explained.
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recognizes that “all property regimes are mixed,” but declines to reduce all
property regimes “to a single type,” because doing so would not aid
analysis. (p. 45). But he never offers a distinctive narrower definition of
mixed property, which makes his use of the term bewildering. This
confusion infects the book’s organization, making it hard to follow his
conceptual path. This does not detract from the book’s strong empirical
case for agnosticism, but it disrupts the book’s flow.
This treatment of regulation as ownership pays some dividends in
a chapter on takings law. Professor Cole argues that takings law involves
collision between private and public property rights, a nice insight. (p.
166). But Cole does not clarify this idea’s relationship to his main thesis.59
He advances a more obviously relevant subsidiary thesis when he
defines the “best” property regime for environmental protection as that
which achieves society’s exogenously set environmental protection goals
at the lowest total cost, defined as the some of exclusion and coordination
costs. (p. 131). Thus, he views the selection of property regimes as
selection of the cheapest means of environmental protection. (p. 132). This
seems like a plausible response to free market environmentalists, who do
claim, after all, that private property regimes protect the environmental
better than public ownership or regulation. Of course, most property rights
scholars will find that cost effective environmental protection cannot be the
sole basis for selecting a property rights regime. One suspects that Dale’s
emissions trading provides the shadow example leading to this
formulation.60 I have argued elsewhere that short term cost effectiveness is
overrated and does not coincide very well with the long term good.61 But
Professor Cole’s emphasis on the value of cost effectiveness certainly
59

Early in the book, Cole claims that takings law makes property an impediment
to environmental protection. (p. 19). This could support his agnosticism claim, but he does
not explicitly link it to that claim. Moreover, the chapter addressing takings does not
highlight this functional point, but a different normative point. He concludes that the Court
should “at least consider the public property rights” at stake in takings cases. (p. 177).
While I’m inclined to agree with that conclusion, I cannot see how that point supports his
largely descriptive thesis, that no one type of property regime is invariably superior.
60
Carol Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L. J. 2175 (1997) (arguing
that shadow examples influence legal analysis).
61
See Driesen, Innovation, supra note 17, at 10097 (arguing that emissions
trading’s failure to encourage initially expensive innovation is problematic, because
expensive innovations sometimes offer wider environmental improvements, lower costs
over time, and lead to greater capability to realize more ambitious environmental goals);
Driesen, supra note 12 (arguing, in the climate change context, that some emissions trading
designs offer a cheap fix, rather than a key to long term progress). See generally DRIESEN,
supra note 53 (arguing that efficiency based approaches do not cope well with change over
time and recommending an alternative based on economic dynamics).
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establishes a position that many scholars will agree with.
On the whole, Cole’s use of rich concepts of property strengthens
his case for agnosticism and offers useful information. He succeeds less
well in clarifying some of the ambiguities in his approach and in developing
strong normative arguments based on it. That may be just as well, for
strong normative arguments would conflict with the book’s central goal of
justifying theoretical agnosticism toward property regimes.
CONCLUSION
This book helps introduce richer conceptions of property to those
unfamiliar with them, rebuts the empirical claims of free market
environmentalists, provides some useful and interesting information to
complicate our views about environmental policy, and illustrates that, for
better or for worse, views about property regimes continue to influence
debates about environmental protection. A property rights lense, however,
has some inherent limitations as an illuminator of modern pollution control
issues.

